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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT. RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF ONEIDA, 
Respondent, 
•and-
#2A-12/4/81 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-5356 
ONEIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
FREDERICK N. RANN, ESQ., for Respondent 
JAMES E. BARNES, II, ESQ., for Charging 
Party 
The matter comes to the Board on the exceptions of the City 
of Oneida to a hearing officer's decision finding it in violation 
of §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law in that it unilaterally changed 
the conditions under which employees represented by the Oneida 
PBA could exchange their assigned shifts. 
Oneida has a small police department of 21 officers, all of 
whom are represented by PBA. There are 14 patrolmen and 7 
supervisors (4 sergeants, 2 lieutenants, and 1 captain). Until 
January 26, 1981, unit employees were permitted to trade their 
assigned shifts with one another regardless of rank. On occasion 
this left shifts without a supervisor. To overcome this, the 
City unilaterally restricted the right of unit employees to trade 
shifts but only to the extent that the shift-for-shift trades 
would leave a tour without a supervisor. Thus, where only a 
single supervisor was assigned to a tour, he could not exchange 
shifts with a patrolman. 
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The hearing officer determined that this was a violation of 
the City's duty to negotiate in good faith. In reaching this 
determination, he concluded that the City had the right to deter-
mine the supervisory complement of each tour, but balanced this 
management prerogative against the employees' right to negotiate 
eons£^c^±n^^he^t^aAi-B.g_o£i^sh±ftLS. He^eojieluded that there, mus-fc _^ 
be some accommodation between these competing interests in that 
there may be ways other than the curtailment of the employees' 
opportunity to trade shifts which would satisfy the City's right 
to have a supervisor on each tour. According to the hearing 
officer, the Taylor Law intends the parties to consider such 
alternatives in collective negotiations. This conclusion is 
based upon this Board's decisions in White Plains, 5;.;PEPJB .53008 (1972) 
and Buffalo.p 141PEKBJ f30533(1931) . In these:: cases , wre^held that "the 
employers were free to decide the number of employees theyrequired 
to work at any given time, but that they violated their duty to 
negotiate in good faith when they unilaterally established 
schedules to accomplish this purpose because alternative 
schedules could have been devised through negotiations to satisfy 
the employers'.manpower needs. 
The hearing officer ruled that by acting unilaterally, the 
City precluded the parties from working together to find an 
alternative means of assuring the presence of a supervisor on 
each tour. This, he concluded, was a violation of its duty to 
negotiate in good faith. 
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We reject the hearing officer's conclusion, finding that it 
misapplies White Plains and Buffalo. In the instant situation, 
the employer did not impose any schedule unilaterally. It merely 
prohibited employees from making schedule switches among them-
selves which would upset its manpower needs. All other schedule 
-^ swi-frch-es—w-e-^ e^ pe^ mi-t-~t:ed. '-"By—p-roh-ib^ t-i-ngp1 s^hri-f-fe^ sw-fee^ e^ —thart' 
would leave tours without supervision, the City did no more than . 
to exercise its management prerogative. The City's right to 
require the presence of a supervisor on all shifts supercedes 
the employee's right to continue to switch shifts when a switch 
would leave a shift without a supervisor.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE REVERSE the hearing officer's decision, 
and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: December 3, 1981 
Albany, New York 
Ida Klaus , Member "~ 
- See Amherst, 12 PERB 1f3071 (1979) 7185 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2B-12/4/81 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 317, an affiliate of the 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF 
AMERICA, 
: BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Respondent,
 C A S E m_ D_ Q 2 1 3 , 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section 210.1 
of the Civil Service Law. 
On April 13, 1981, Martin L. Barr, Counsel to this Board, 
filed a charge alleging that Teamsters Local 317, an affiliate of 
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America (Local 317), had violated Civil 
Service Law §210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, 
condoned and engaged in a strike against the Onondaga County 
Water Authority (Authority) on February 20, 21, and 22, 1981. 
The charge further alleges that on Friday, February 20, 56 
of the 69 employees in the negotiating unit represented by 
Local 317 who were scheduled to work, absented themselves. On I 
! 
Saturday, February 21, all three scheduled employees were 
! 
absent. On Sunday, February 22, two of the three scheduled j 
employees were absent. j 
The matter then came to this Board on the charge unanswered j 
when Local 317 withdrew its answer upon its understanding that j 
i 
the charging-party would recommend an agreed-upon penalty. The 
charging party recommended that the dues and agency shop fee 
[ 
deduction privileges of Local 317 be suspended for an indefinite j 
71 °!v 
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period of time, with permission to be granted to Locai 317 to 
apply to this Board for the restoration of those privileges one 
year after the date of this Board's decision, provided that 
certain conditions were met. We determined that the recommended 
penalty was consistent with the policies of the Taylor Law and we 
- lmpoS-&d^ t^^ by^ oMr^ o^ jde^ ^^  1981. - --, _ _ 
Local 317 thereafter moved this Board to withdraw the 
penalty on the ground that it was not one to which it had agreed. 
It asserted that it withdrew its answer upon the condition that 
its dues deduction privileges would be suspended for the period 
of time specified in the order, but that it did not agree to any 
suspension of its agency shop fee deductions. 
Upon review of the correspondence between Local 317 and the 
charging party, we concluded that there may have been a mis- j 
understanding between them regarding the penalty that would be 
recommended by the charging party. Accordingly, by decision 
issued on September 10, 1981, we withdrew our decision of 
July 23, 1981, ordered reinstatement of the answer of Local 317 
and remanded the matter to the hearing officer for further 
proceedings. 
By letter dated October 30, 1981, Local 317 withdrew its 
answer upon the understanding that the charging party would 
recommend, and this Board would impose, the same penalty 
imposed by our order dated July 23, 1981. The charging party 
has recommended this penalty. I 
Board - D-0213 
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On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that 
Local 317 violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike as 
charged. 
This is the second strike by Local 317, the first being a 
three—-day—one—in—M)^ 
We therefore determine that the. recommended penalty is a 
reasonable one and furthers the policies of the Act: 
WE ORDER that the dues deduction and agency shop fee 
privileges, if any, of Teamster Local 317, an 
affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, be suspended indefinitely, commencing on the 
first practicable date, provided that it may apply to 
this Board after the expiration of one year from the 
date of this order for the full restoration of such 
privileges. Such application shall be on notice 
to all interested parties and supported by proof of 
good faith compliance with subdivision 1 of CSL §210 
since the violation herein found, such proof to 
include, for example, the successful negotiation, J 
without a violation of said subdivision, of a contract! 
covering the employees in the unit affected by the 
violation and accompanied by an affirmation that it 
D-0213 -4 
no longer asserts the right to strike against any 
government as required by the provisions of 
CSL §210,3(g). 
MceTifbe1f^7^i:9 81f 
A l b a n y , New York 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
David C. R a n d i e s , Memb 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
in the Matter of 
CITY OF WHITE PLAINS, 
- a n d -
R e s p o n d e n t , 
#2C-12/4/81 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
PROFESSTONAIr-FTRE^FTGHTERS—ASSOtTATrON^OF-
WHITE PLAINS, NEW YORK, INC., LOCAL 274, 
IAFF, AFL-CIO, CLC and WILLIAM C. HARMON, 
Charging Parties. 
CASE NO. U-4659 
RAINS & POGREBIN, ESOS., (PAUL J. 
SCHREIBER, of Counsel), for Respondent 
DUNCAN MACRAE, PRESIDENT, for Charging 
Parties 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Professional 
Fire Fighters Association of White Plains, N.Y., Inc.,- Local 274, 
I.A.F.F., AFL-CIO, CLC (Association) and William C. Harmon, 
charging parties herein, to a hearing officer's decision dis-
missing their charge that the City of White Plains (City) denied a 
promotion to Harmon because he filed a grievance, thus violating 
§209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Taylor Law. 
FACTS 
Harmon has been employed by the City as a firefighter since 
October 1968 and has generally enjoyed very high performance 
evaluations. He took and passed the promotional examination 
in 1975, but was not reachable for promotion until August 
1977. That was six months after the grievance referred to in 
Board - U-4659 -2 
the charge arose. He was passed over at that time and again 
passed over in September 1977 and January 1978. Thereafter, in 
February 1980 he was passed over on two additional occasions. 
The charge herein, which was filed shortly after the 
February 1980 promotions, complains that Harmon was passed over 
at that time because he had filed a grievance in February 1977. 
Harmon was then Sergeant-at-Arms of the Association. The alleged 
grievance arose out of headquarters' denial of Harmon's call 
requesting a snow plow to clear parking spaces on the street on 
February 4, 1977. Lt. Quinn, a unit employee and a friend of 
Harmon's, answered the call and told him the plow was not available 
because it was being used for other purposes. This led to a 
dispute between Quinn and Harmon who said he was going to file a 
grievance. No formal grievance was ever filed, but the parties 
refer to Harmon's complaint as a grievance. The complaint angered 
Quinn, as it did Deputy Chief Daman, also a unit employee and a 
friend of Harmon. Both warned Harmon that he was making "trouble" 
for himself by filing a grievance. When, on February
 (8, Harmon 
told Quinn and Daman that he had not intended his grievance to be 
a threat and that he would not pursue it, Daman responded that the 
"damage" had already been done and that Harmon's chances for 
promotion had already been hurt. 
Harmon spoke about ''the grievance" to the Association 
President, Koop, who told him the availability of the snow plow 
was going to be raised at an upcoming labor-management meeting. 
It was raised at a labor-management meeting held on February 25, 
Board - U-4659 
197 7 and it appears to have been resolved satisfactorily. 
-3 
The 
discussion did not deal with the problem in terms of Harmon's 
"grievance"—' as the Asso'ciation had expressed dissatisfaction 
with the priorities for the use of the snow plow even before 
February 4, 1977. 
' ShQ-r-tl^ y^ a#ter-^ he^ s-a-id—he—wa-s—goi^ n^ -^ to—f^ l^ e^ a—g-r4re-v-a-ne:e:y::-^  
Harmon was involuntarily transferred from Station 1 to Station 7. 
Harmon testified that he viewed Station 7 as a "punishment house". 
The record shows that some time before "the grievance" incident 
the officer in charge of Station 7, an active Association member; 
had asked for Harmon's transfer, but that Harmon's objections to 
the transfer had prevailed before "the grievance" incident. 
On several occasions Harmon spoke to Fire Chief McMahon 
about the pass-overs. At first McMahon was angry with Harmon 
about the snow plow request because he misunderstood why Harmon 
2/ had asked for it.— He also told Harmon that he was passed over 
because he had made "bad decisions". 
Firefighter promotions are made by Commissioner of Public 
Safety Dolce upon the recommendation of Deputy Commissioner of 
Public Safety Motto, who consults with Fire Chief McMahon. Motto 
interviewed Harmon for promotion on two occasions. He testified 
that Harmon appeared to be giving the answers to questions that 
he thought would please him rather than expressing his own 
— Koop testified that he mentioned Harmon's name in passing. Both 
Commissioner Dolce and Chief McMahon, who attended the meeting 
on behalf of management, testified that they had no recollection 
. of any mention of Harmon's name. 
2/ 
— He had thought that Harmon had disobeyed an order to shovel 
the station's walks and ramps. 
Board - U-4659 
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judgment. This persuaded him that Harmon lacked the leadership 
qualities required of a lieutenant even though he was a good" 
firefighter. He further testified that he knew nothing of "the 
3/ grievance" referred to in the charge.— Both McMahon and Motto 
testified that McMahon's sole role in Motto's consideration of 
as to whether Harmon was a good firefighter. None of this 
testimony was contradicted and the hearing officer credited it. 
The record of promotions and pass-overs in the City shows 
that other firefighters have been passed over and that, officers of 
the Associationiand.. other union activists have been among those 
promoted- .'-.:'• :":. , . 
DISCUSSION 
On these facts, the hearing officer concluded that there was 
no causal connection between "the grievance" filed by Harmon and 
Motto's failure to recommend him for promotion in 1980. 
In support of their exceptions, the charging parties argue 
that the hearing officer erred in concluding that Motto's 
decision not to recommend Harmon for promotion was uninfluenced 
by "the grievance". According to -charging parties, the importance 
of the snow plow "grievance" to the City is reflected by the 
anger of Quinn and Daman, the transfer of Harmon to Station 7, 
and Chief McMahon's reference to Harmon's "bad decisions", which 
1
 they interpret as meaning his statement that he was going to 
bring a grievance. Thus, according to charging parties, Motto 
—Motto had not attended the labor-management meeting of 
February 25, 1977. ^ » A n 
Board - U-4659 -5 
must have known about "the grievance" and his decision must have 
been influenced by it. 
The exceptions raise questions as to the weight of the 
evidence. Daman and Quinn were in the same negotiating unit as 
Harmon and their anger cannot be attributed to the City.— 
Wevextrh;e-res^^ 
the incident. If so, it may raise a question as to the'reliability 
of Motto's testimony that he was unaware of it. Other known 
facts also suggest that "the grievance" was of substantial 
concern within the Fire Department and might, therefore, have 
caught the attention of Motto. Harmon's transfer in 1977 to 
Station 7 might have been benign, but it raises a suspicion of 
antagonism towards him. Finally, McMahon's reference to "bad 
decisions" could refer to "the grievance", but it is far from 
clear that it does. While some of the facts might lead us to 
suspect that Harmon was passed over for promotion because of his 
"grievance", other facts indicate otherwise. Harmon never did 
file a formal grievance and the underlying problem, which ante-
dates "the grievance" incident, appears to have been resolved 
satisfactorily. Moreover, other officers and activists of the 
Association have been promoted. 
The suspicions raised by the record cannot overcome Motto's 
critical testimony that he did not know of "the grievance" when 
he made the decision not to recommend Harmon for promotion. The 
hearing officer who heard this testimony believed Motto. There 
-^See McNamee and Sullivan County Sheriff, 3 PERB 1[8006 (1970), 
aff'd 3 PERB 1(3041 (1970). 
' 7204 
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5/, is no basis for reversing-her conclusion.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law of the hearing officer and we determine 
that she committed no prejudicial error in 
the conduct of the hearing and we order that 
the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED; Albany, New York 
December 4, 1981 
Harold R. Newman', Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
avid C, Randies, Membe 
5/ Charging parties'? exceptions complain'about some aspects of 
the hearing officer's conduct of the hearing. We find no 
prejudicial error by the hearing officer. Nothing done by the 
hearing officer' interfered with the charging parties r 
opportunity to prove that Motto's action was influenced by 
"the grievance." 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
Charging Party. 
#2D-12/4/81 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-5036 
JOSEPH P. McNAMAEA, ESQ. (RAUL FIGUEROA, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
SARGENT & REPKA, P.C. (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
r 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Buffalo 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to a hearing officer's 
decision dismissing its charge that the City of Buffalo (City) 
improperly transferred two of its officers to.different job 
assignments. Lydon, the PBA Vice President, and Pascale,, a 
member of the PBA's Board of Directors, were involuntarily' trans-
ferred from the Radar and Point Control Units of the Traffic 
Division respectively to precincts in October 1980. In its charge, 
PBA alleges that they were transferred in retaliation for 
preparing statistical data which PBA used to defend its conduct 
in. a court action in which the City charged PBA with a concerted 
work slowdown. The hearing officer concluded that the evidence 
did not support the charge. 
7 2 f t S 
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Point Control Unit was cut from 20 to 6, but thereafter one of 
the police officers, Williams, was returned to the unit. The 
record does not show the extent of the force reduction in the 
Radar Unit, but there too one of the officers, Dux, was returned 
after the cut. 
Cunningham, the Police Commissioner, explained why he 
returned Williams and Dux instead of Pascale and Lydon. 
Cunningham testified that when a female officer who had been in 
the Point Control Unit was granted a leave of absence, he 
returned Williams, also a female, because he wanted a woman in 
the unit. He indicated, however, that there was no reason why 
a female employee was needed in the unit. He testified further 
that it was a random choice which led to the return of Dux rather 
than Lydon. In this connection, he denied considering the fact 
that Lydon was a PBA officer while Dux was not. He also 
testified that he did not consider their relative seniority or 
their comparative effectiveness as policemen. 
PBA contends that the prior Police Commissioner had made an 
oral commitment not to transfer union officers involuntarily. 
Cunningham testified that he did not know whether his predecessor 
had actually made such a commitment, but that he was aware that 
there had been discussion about the alleged commitment. He 
asserted that he had not agreed to follow that commitment; that 
he could not do so because there were so many PBA officers that 
such a commitment would interfere -with his ability to deploy his 
staff. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that some years earlier he 
Board - U-5036 
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FACTS 
A consultant recommended to the Police Commissioner that the 
Traffic Division be eliminated and its complement transferred to 
the precincts. The record does not show when this recommendation 
was first made, but it was known as early as 1978. The Police 
;
 Gomrniss^ 
alternative recommendation to reduce the size of the Traffic 
Division. Such action was taken on October 24, 1980. 
' In September 1980, an interest arbitration award had been 
issued to resolve a negotiation dispute between PBA and the 
City. The award displeased PBA. According to the City, PBA 
reacted by engaging in a slowdown. The City sought to enjoin 
the alleged slowdown. At the trial, the Police Commissioner tried 
to prove that there was a slowdown in the Traffic Division by 
testifying as to its productivity in both September 1979 and 
September 1980. Throughout.the trial, which lasted six days, 
Lydon and Pascale sat in the courtroom. They also prepared 
materials for PBA's attorney which were used to contradict the 
Commissioner. The record does not show where in the courtroom 
they sat or whether the materials they prepared were given to the 
PBA attorney in the courtroom or at some other public place. 
Neither does it show whether other PBA officers or unit employees 
attended the court proceedings. 
Shortly after the conclusion of the court proceeding, the 
Commissioner cut the size of the Traffic Division. Lydon and 
Pascale were among the first group of about 11 police officers 
to be transferred to precincts. Other transfers followed. The 
Board - U-5036 •4 
had transferred Pascale involuntarily and then reversed the 
transfer when told of his predecessor's oral commitment. The 
Commissioner offered no : explanation for his decision to reverse 
the earlier transfer of Pascale which might contradict PBA's alle-
gation that he returned Pascale out of respect for the practice 
introduced by the past Commissioner. 
DISCUSSION 
The record evidence raises suspicion as to the propriety 
of Commissioner Cunningham's decision to transfer Lydon and 
Pascale from the Traffic Division to precincts. The record as 
a whole, however, does not support the charge because it lacks 
convincing evidence relating the transfers to Lydon's and 
Pascale's preparation of statistical data for PBA's lawsuit. 
This is because there is no. reasonable basis in the record for 
concluding that Cunningham knew that Lydon and Pascale were 
providing the information used to contradict his testimony in the 
lawsuit. Hence, PBA has failed to prove that the transfers were 
unlawfully motivated. 
The timing of the transfers, one month after the trial, 
rather than shortly after the recommendation of the consultant, 
might indicate that the lawsuit was a factor Cunningham considered 
in deciding to make the transfers. That decision might be 
subject to question in view of the fact that he had cancelled a 
transfer of Pascale some years before when told that his prede-
cessor had made an oral commitment not to transfer union officers 
involuntarily and the further fact that Cunningham gave no other 
reason for the recall of Pascale at that time. His explanation 
nm AlA, 
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that he did not follow the past practice in the case of Lydon and 
Pascale because there were too many PBA officers for him to be 
able to deploy his staff effectively if he were not free to trans-
fer union officers is not convincing in view of his return to the 
Division of Dux and Williams rather than Lydon and Pascale. 
-..--: No-twiths-tanding these questionable-circumstances ,-; we -cannot -
conclude that Cunningham transferred Lydon and Pascale in retali-
ation for their preparation of statistical data which were used'to 
contradict his testimony in the lawsuit. The basic fact is that 
there is no substantial evidence to show that Cunningham knew of 
the role of Lydon or Pas.cale ;in preparation'.of :the. statistical: 
data used .in the lawsuit. 
Accordingly, we dismiss the exceptions, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
DISMISSED. 
DATED: December 3, 1981 
Albany, New York 
g%^»-* /dx&ut^t** -
Ida•Klaus, Member 
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STATE CF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#26-12/4/81 
In the Matter of 
WEST HEMPSTEAD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
mS^^HEig:S:TEA^^ffl!iE:S::^S:S^eTAT1:ON7 ' '^  : r 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
^egssr^mr^ff^r&szr 
HENRY A. WEINSTEIN, ESQ., for Respondent 
KAPLOWITZ & GALINSON, ESQS. (BARBARA J. 
JOHNSON, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging 
Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the West 
Hempstead Aides Association (Association) to a hearing officer's 
decision dismissing its charge that the West Hempstead Union Free 
School District (District) acted improperly when, effective 
July 1, 1979, it transferred the duties and functions involved 
in the supervision of the student cafeteria from teacher aides 
to teachers.— Teacher aides, who are represented by the 
Association, had performed these duties and functions since 1967. 
In 1979, however, the District determined that the teacher aides 
were not performing this work effectively and that the task was 
beyond their capability. 
In the preceding several years there had been an increasing 
number of incidents in the student cafeteria involving the 
1/ In a prior decision, 14 PERB 1[3024 (March 31, 1981)', we remanded 
this matter to the hearing officer to obtain additional evidence 
£ /JLi 
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throwing of food, individual fights and gang fights, incursions 
by nonstudents, thefts, vandalism and fires started in trash 
baskets. Concluding that teachers would.be better able to 
maintain discipline in the student cafeteria, the District 
unilaterally transferred to teachers the work of the aides. The 
tr^ari^feir'tinvb^^ "' The" -•--••- --
immediate effect of the transfer v?as that some teacher aides 
lost.their jobs with the District. Thereupon, the Association 
brought the charge herein contesting the District's conduct on 
the ground that the transfer of the work of the aides is a 
mandatory subject of negotiation and that the District had not 
been free to take that action unilaterally. The Association 
did not seek to negotiate the impact of the District's action. 
We have found the transfer of work performed by unit 
employees to nonunit employees is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation which a public employer may not effect unilaterally. 
Northport Union Free School District, 9 PERB 1[3003 (1976), aff'd 
54 App. Div. 2d 935 (2d Dept., 1976), 9 PERB 17021.-/ This is 
because such a transfer may lead to the loss of jobs by unit 
employees and thus affects the terms and conditions of their 
employment. 
2/ 
The Northport School District was found to have violated its 
duty to negotiate in good faith when it assigned an administrator 
to do work that had been performed by teachers. See also East 
Ramapo Central School District, 10 PERB 113064 (1977). 
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We have also found that a public employer is under no duty 
to negotiate the nature or extent of the services that it 
chooses to provide to its constituency. New Rochelie City 
School District, 4 PERB 113060 (1971). Where, as here, the 
decision of a public employer to transfer work from unit 
employees is related to its decision to alter the level of 
service it provides to its constituency, we must apply a 
balancing test which considers the interests of both the unit 
employees and the public employer. 
On the facts before us, we recognize the presence of 
significant competing interests. There has been an actual loss 
of jobs by unit employees. This has also affected the 
Association's status as bargaining representative. On the other 
hand, the District must provide a sanitary and safe environment 
in the cafeteria for the benefit of the students and it must 
protect its own property. The deterioration of conditions 
confronted the District with a compelling need to upgrade the 
quality of its supervision of the cafeteria. The District's' 
belief that teachers may be better able to supervise the 
cafeteria than teacher aides is a reasonable one. Within the 
school, teachers are generally recognized as exercising greater 
authority over students than teacher aides. For these reasons, 
we conclude that, under the circumstances herein, the District's 
interest in transferring the supervision ;of the student 
cafeteria from teacher aides to teachers was undertaken in the 
Board - U-4056 
performance of its basic mission and was a management preroga-
3/ 
-4 
tive. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing officer, 
and 
WE ORDER the charge herein be, and it hereby 
•--•--"-••--•• ••--•••-:- i^^t)TSMTS:SEDv. : 
DATED: December 4, 1981 
Albany,- New York 
arold R. Newman' Chairman 
*&** ^j^bu^a^-
Ida Klaus, Member 
3/ 
—We note that there is no indication in the record that the 
transfer of duties was undertaken to undermine the Association's 
status as negotiating representative of the unit employees or 
that the transfers would nullify the collective bargaining 
agreement. k2 
